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SMOKERS' RIGHTS LEGISLATION: SHOULD
THE STATE "BUTT OUT" OF THE
WORKPLACE?
Cigarette smoking kills approximately 350,000 Americans each
year) It is responsible for more deaths than AIDS, cocaine, heroin,
alcohol, fire, automobile accidents, homicide and suicide combined. 2
Furthermore, the toll from smoking is not limited to its adverse
health effects.3 The economic costs of smoking are also extremely
high, for the smoker, for employers and for society at large. 4 The
Office of Technology Assessment estimated that in 1985 alone,
smoking cost society sixty-five billion dollars. 5 Employers have dis-
covered that workers who smoke can be costly to their businesses
as well. 6 Estimates of the cost to employers for each smoking em-
ployee have ranged as high as $4,611 per year.?
As a result, many states and municipalities have passed statutes
and ordinances to control smoking.8 Some employers, both public
and private, have gone beyond imposing restrictions on smoking in
the workplace and have banned off-duty smoking by their employ-
ees as well' To date, no court has found any of these bans on
smoking to be unconstitutional or otherwise illegali°
In response to these prohibitions, twenty-one states have passed
"smokers' rights" laws." These laws are generally of two types. The
majority of the statutes specifically prohibit employers from discrim-
I Kenneth Warner, Health and Economic Implications of a Tobacco-Free Society, 258 JAMA,
2080, 2081 (1987).
2 Id.
See Elizabeth B. Thompson, Note, The Constitutionality of an Off-Duty Smoking Ban for
Public Employees: Should the State Butt Out?, 43 VAND. L. REV. 491, 496 (1990).
Id.
5 Id.
" See Lawrence Garfinkel, Advocates Ban, in Do Puffing Employees Send Profits up in Smoke?
[hereinafter Puffing Employees), Bus. & Soc'v REV., Spring 1984, 4, 5.
7 Id.
° Mark A. Rothstein, Refusing to Employ Smokers: Good Public Health or Bad Public Policy?,
62 NontE DAME L. REV. 940, 946 (1987).
" See id. at 951.
10 See Grusendorf v. City of Oklahoma City, 816 F.2d 539 (10th Cir. 1987). In Grusendorf,
the only case to date dealing with the constitutionality of bans on off-duty smoking, the court
upheld a city ordinance banning off-work smoking by beginning firefighters. Id. at 543,
II The twenty-one states that have passed smokers' rights laws are Arizona, Colorado,
Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Mississippi, Nevada, New Hamp-
shire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee and Virginia.
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880	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 	 [Vol. 33:879
inating against employees or applicants who smoke off the job, 12
Four states, however, do not mention smoking specifically but in-
stead prohibit discrimination against employees or applicants who
engage in legal activities or use lawful products while off-duty.' 3
This note analyzes the evolution of these smokers' rights laws,
and critically examines their public policy implications." To resolve
the conceptual and practical problems that current smokers' rights
laws raise, this note proposes a model smokers' rights statute. 13
Section I describes the health and economic factors that have caused
employers to resort to off-duty smoking bans.' 6 Section II examines
the legal status of these bans, focusing on the decision in Grusendotf
v. City of Oklahoma City," the only case to date involving the consti-
tutionality of an off-duty smoking ban for public employees.' 8 Sec-
tion III analyzes the smokers' rights laws passed in response to these
bans.'° This section examines the provisions of the two major types
of smokers' rights statutes, tobacco-specific laws, 2° and general pro-
hibitions against discrimination based on the off-duty use of lawful
products,2 ' and discusses their policy justifications. 22 Section IV ad-
dresses the public policy implications of smokers' rights laws, 23
 and
proposes a model statute that avoids the flaws of current statutes. 24
This section concludes that by extending protection only to ern-
12 IND. CODE § 22-5-4 (1991); KY. REV, STAT. ANN. § 344.040 (Baldwin 1990); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. TIT. 26, 597 (West 1991); 1991 Miss. Laws 610(17); 1991 N.H. Laws 275:37-a;
1991 N.M. Laws 244; OR. REV. STAT. § 659.380 (1989); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-20.7.1-1 (1989);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 41-1-85 (Law. Co-op. 1990); 1991 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 60-4-14
(1991); TENN. CODE ANN. § 771(1-2) (1990); VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-29.18 (Michie 1989);
1991 Ariz. Legis. Serv. 284(2)(F) (West); 1991 Conn. Legis. Serv. 271(3) (West); 1991 La.
Sess. Law Serv. 762(966) (West); 1991 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 207(34:6B) (West); 1991 Okla.
Sess. Law Serv. 172(11-14) (West). All of the above statutes specifically prohibit employer
discrimination against applicants or employees who smoke or use tobacco products while off-
duty.
Cow. REV. STAT. § 24-34-402.5 (1990); 1991 Nev. Stat. 359(1-4); 1991 N.D. Laws
142(14-02.4-01); and 1991 III. Legis. Serv. 87-807 (West) all contain a more general prohib-
ition of employer discrimination against applicants or employees who use lawful products or
engage in legal activities while off-duty.
14 See infra notes 26-205 and accompanying text.
15 See infra notes 172-205 and accompanying text.
16 See infra notes 26-76 and accompanying text.
" 816 F.2d 539 (10th Cir. 1987).
" See infra notes 77-114 and accompanying text.
19 See infra notes 115-71 and accompanying text.
29 See infra notes 120-45 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 146-52 and accompanying text.
"See infra notes 153-71 and accompanying text.
99 See infra notes 172-205 and accompanying text.
24 See infra section 1V.0.
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ployees, and not to applicants, states can resolve many of the diffi-
culties involved with current smokers' rights laws, and can more
fairly balance the right of employers to hire whom they want with
the right of smokers to be free from unfair discrimination. 25
I. REASONS WHY EMPLOYERS HAVE BANNED OFF-DUTY SMOKING
BY THEIR EMPLOYEES
According to a 1988 survey, six percent of all employers in the
United States currently discriminate against off-duty smokers."
Some companies, such as U-Haul International, assess smoking em-
ployees more than nonsmokers for health insurance. 27 Others go
even further and refuse to employ anyone who smokes at home or
at work.28 For example, Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. ("TBS")
implemented an off-duty ban after its employees voted to prohibit
employing smokers. 29
The primary motivation of employers in implementing these
policies is to reduce the costs associated with employees who
smoke. 3° These costs result from the enormous health risks attrib-
uted to smoking. 3 ' The following section addresses these health
risks, particularly the relationships between smoking and cancer,
heart disease and chronic obstructive lung disease.
A. The Health Consequences of Smoking
The overall cancer mortality rate for smokers is substantially
greater than that of nonsmokers. 32 Indeed, smoking is the principal
cause of lung cancer in the United States, with mortality rates for
heavy smokers as high as twenty-five times those of nonsmokers."
Smoking is also the major cause of laryngeal cancer in the United
States, with mortality rates for heavy smokers up to thirty times
" See infra section IV.E,
20 ACLU, LEGISLATIVE BRIEFING SERIES: LIFESTYLE DISCRIMINATION 1 (1991).
27 Id. at 3.
22 See id.
"Alexa Bell, Companies Increasingly Police Employees' Lifestyles, INVESTOR'S Bus. DAILY (Los
Angeles), Oct. 1B, 1991, at 10.
5° ACLU, supra note 26, at 1.
5 ) Garfinkel, supra note 6, at 5.
52 C. EVEREIT KOOP, THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING: CANCER 5 (1982). Ac-
cording to the Surgeon General's report, male smokers have twice the cancer death rate of
male nonsmokers, and female smokers have a thirty percent greater death rate than female
nonsmokers. Id.
" Id.
882	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 33:879
those of nonsmokers. 34 In addition, smoking is a major cause of
cancers of the oral cavity and of the esophagus, and is a contributing
factor in the development of cancers of the bladder, kidney and
pancreas."
In addition, according to the United States Surgeon General,
cigarette smoking is the most important of the known, modifiable
risk factors for coronary heart disease in the United States." Heavy
smokers, those who smoke more than two packs a day, have four
times the incidence of coronary heart disease of nonsmokers."
Smoking also acts synergistically with other risk factors such as
elevated serum cholesterol and hypertension to increase greatly the
risk of coronary heart disease." Overall, smokers have a two to four
times greater risk of sudden death than do nonsmokers."
Perhaps the strongest connection between smoking and disease
exists in the area of chronic obstructive lung disease ("COLD"). 4°
According to the Surgeon General, the contribution of cigarette
smoking to COLD illness and mortality far outweighs the contri-
bution of other factors.'" The death rate for COLD in smokers as
compared with nonsmokers is as large or larger than it is for lung
cancer, the disease most people associate with smoking. 42
The dangers of smoking are not confined only to smokers
themselves. 43 According to a 1986 Surgeon General's report, invol-
untary smoking is a cause of disease, including lung cancer, in
otherwise healthy nonsmokers.'" The 1986 report found that chil-
dren of parents who smoke have an increased frequency of respi-
ratory symptoms and infections.45 The report also found that chil-
dren of smokers had slightly smaller rates of increase in lung
function as their lungs matured.46
34 Id. at 7.
"Id.
55 C. EVERETT KOOP, THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING: CARDIOVASCULAR DISEASE
4 (1983).
57 Id. at 9.
55 Id.
21 fd. The risk of death increases with increasing dosage as measured by the number of
cigarettes smoked per day. Id.
4° C. EVERETT KooP, THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING: CHRONIC OB5TRUCrivE
LUNG DISEASE at vii (1984).
41 Id.
4 2 1d. at ix.
15 C. EVERETT KOOP, THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING: INVOLUNTARY SMOKING
7 (1986).
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 Id.
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B. The Economic Costs of Smoking
While the health impact of smoking is staggering, its economic
costs are also quite high. 47 Both former and current smokers incur
more hospitalization, use more medical services and visit doctors
more frequently than nonsmokers. 48 For example, the Dow Chem-
ical Company discovered that one of its divisions was losing nearly
$600,000 per year due to absenteeism of ill smokers. 49
Employees who smoke, because of their greater use of medical
services, have increased health insurance costs for employers."
Rates for both individual and group health insurance are six to
twenty-two percent lower for nonsmokers than for smokers. 5 ' Thus,
by hiring only nonsmokers, employers can significantly reduce their
health insurance costs. 52
Evidence also suggests that nonsmokers may be more produc-
tive employees than smokers." Employers who hire only nonsmok-
ers can achieve significant savings on sick leave, absenteeism, turn-
over and similar costs. 54 One study found smokers were absent from
work an extra 2.2 days per year, costing employers an average of
$220 per year. 55 The study also estimated that smokers cost em-
ployers $1,820 per year in lost productivity due to smoking rituals. 56
Other studies suggest that smokers may be more prone to anxiety
and depression than nonsmokers."
Another reason employers: may prefer to ban off-duty smoking
is that such bans make it easier to enforce workplace smoking
restrictions." Many companies impose severe restrictions on work-
place smoking, either voluntarily or because they are required to
by law. 59 •By hiring only nonsmokers, these companies can reduce
or eliminate "time-consuming and dissension-producing efforts" to
enforce worksite smoking bans."
" See Rothstein, supra note 8, at 945.
45 Id.
49 Athena Mueller, Smokers' Segregation, in Puffing Employees, supra note 6, at 7.
50 See Rothstein, supra note 8, at 954.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 953.
"Joseph W. Cullen, Health is Key Concern, in Puffing Employees, supra note 6, at 9.
54 Rothstein, supra note 8, at 954.
55 Thompson, supra note 3, at 496.
55 Id. at 497.
57 Bell, supra note 29, at 10.
55 Rothstein, supra note 8, at 953.
59 Id. at 949-50.
55 1d, at 953.
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Many state and local governments have banned off-duty smok-
ing by firefighters because of presumptions in state workers' com-
pensation laws." These laws often contain provisions that create an
irrebuttable presumption that all heart and lung illnesses suffered
by firefighters are related to work.62 State and local governments
often believe that many of these ailments are caused by smoking,
either instead of, or in addition to, work-related causes.° By em-
ploying only firefighters who do not smoke, governments can re-
duce the cost of workers' compensation benefits related to respira-
tory and cardiovascular illnesses."
A related problem is that cigarette smoke often acts synergist-
ically with other environmental factors to greatly increase the risk
of disease. 65 While asbestos workers have five times the lung cancer
death rate of other blue collar workers, asbestos workers who smoke
have fifty times the death rate of other blue collar workers who do
not smoke. 66 Gold mine and certain rubber industry exposures also
act synergistically with smoking to increase greatly the risk of disease
in employees.67 In addition, employees who smoke may suffer cu-
mulative effects if they are exposed to chlorine, cotton dust or coal
dust.68 By prohibiting off-duty smoking, employers in these fields
can reduce health care and insurance costs as these synergistic or
cumulative effects are likely to be produced by off-duty smoking as
well as by smoking at work.°
There is no universal agreement, however, about the extent of
the economic costs of smoking. According to Horace Kornegay,
chairman of the Tobacco Institute, a trade association for the to-
bacco industry, much of the research linking smoking with increased
absenteeism, decreased productivity and higher insurance rates is
biased and inaccurate.7° Kornegay claims that implementing smok-
61 Id. at 952.
62 Id.
63 Rothstein, supra note 8, at 953.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 951.
" Id.
67 Id.
se Id. at 951-52.
" Id. at 952.
76 Horace R. Kornegay, Disputed Research, in Puffing Employees, supra note 6, at 9. Kornegay
cites research done by Dr. Lewis Solomon, an economist at the University of California at
Los Angeles. Id. Solomon's research calls into question the reliability and accuracy of a study
made by Dr. William Weiss of Seattle University that attributed increased absenteeism,
decreased productivity and higher insurance rates to smoking. Id; see also Puffing Employees,
supra note 6, at 4.
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ing prohibitions would impose unnecessary costs on many busi-
nesses, such as creating separate smoking areas. 71 Kornegay also
claims that smoking prohibitions could have a negative impact on
employee morale, and thus could lead to a decrease in productivity
and profits. 72 Some experts also claim that a refusal to hire smokers
will increase costs to businesses because it will lead to a large re-
duction in the pool of employable persons."
Whatever the actual economic costs of employing smokers, an
increasing number of employers are banning both on and off the
job smoking by their employees. 74 In a survey of Seattle-area hiring
managers, almost ninety percent said they would give preference
to applicants who did not smoke when told that smokers were twice
as likely as nonsmokers to be absent from work." Given this trend,
it is not surprising that legal challenges have been raised against
these employer policies."
H. LEGAL CHALLENGES TO OFF-DUTY SMOKING BANS
A. Public Employees
In the 1987 case of Grusendorf v. City of Oklahoma City, a trainee
firefighter raised the first constitutional challenge to an off-duty
smoking ban for public employees." In Grusendorf, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit rejected a substantive due
process challenge to an off-duty smoking ban for new firefighters. 78
After giving the smoking ban a presumption of validity, the court
of appeals held that the ban was constitutional because it was a
rational way to promote the health and safety of firefighter train-
ees. 79
In Grusendorf, the city hired Grusendorf as a trainee firefigh-
ter." On December 14, 1984, he took three puffs from a cigarette
while on his lunch break. 8 ' The city fire chief fired him that after-
7L See Kornegay, supra note 70, at 9.
72 Id.
73 Thompson, supra note 3, at 497.
74 ACLU, supra note 26, at 1.
75 Advice to Applicants—Looking for a Job? Don't Smoke, 25 L. OFF. EcoN. & MoNcr. 340
(1984).
76 See infra notes 77-105 and accompanying text.
" 816 F.2d 539, 540 (10th Cir. 1987).
78
 Id. at 543.
79 Id.
" Id. at 540.
81 Id.
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noon on the grounds that he had violated a signed agreement not
to smoke on or off the job.82 The fire chief learned of Grusendorf's
smoking through another city employee who observed the incident
and reported it to the city fire department." When Grusendorf
admitted he had smoked, the fire chief fired him. 84
Grusendorf brought suit against the city and his supervisors at
the Oklahoma City Fire Department, claiming that his constitutional
rights to liberty, privacy, property and due process had been vio-
lated." In an unreported decision, the United States District Court
for the Western District of Oklahoma dismissed Grusendorf's
claim." On appeal, Grusendorf argued that the smoking ban re-
quired him to give up his constitutional rights of liberty and pri-
vacy. 87 The defendants argued that the nonsmoking regulation did
not infringe upon any constitutionally-protected liberty or privacy
interest. 88 They claimed that because the right to smoke did not
rise to the level of a fundamental right, there was no need to apply
any type of balancing test, or provide any rationale to justify the
off-duty ban. 89
With little explanation, the court of appeals agreed with the
defendants that smoking did not rise to the level of a fundamental
right." The court stated, however, that recognizing this did not
effectiVely dispose of Grusendorf's claim. 9 ' The court pointed out
that the defendants' reasoning would suggest that the state could
arbitrarily condition employment on an agreement to refrain from
an almost unlimited number of harmless private and personal ac-
tivities.92
es Grusendorf v. City of Oklahoma City, 816 F.2d 539, 540 (10th Cir. 1987).
83 Id.
a* Id.
83 Id.
See id.
87 Id. The court of appeals stated that while the right to privacy is not clearly spelled out
in the Constitution, the Supreme Court has recognized this right in several decisions. Id. The
court of appeals noted that the rights to privacy and liberty have been described as "pen.
umbras" emanating from the Bill of Rights, citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
484 (1964), "zones of privacy" implicit in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of liberty,
citing Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937), or simply "the right to be left alone,"
citing Olmstead v, United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Grusen-
dorf, 816 F.2d at 540-41.
Grusendorf, 816 F.2d at 541.
89 Id.
98 See id.
9 ' Id.
92 Id. at 542.
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Instead, the court followed the approach taken by the United
States Supreme Court in the 1975 case of Kelley v. John,son. 93 In
Kelley, the Supreme Court rejected a policeman's claim that a de-
partment hair-length regulation violated the Due Process Clause
and Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution. 94 In sustaining the regulation, the Court
gave it a presumption of validity as a valid exercise of the state's
police power." The Court framed the issue as whether the regula-
tion was so irrational that it was arbitrary and therefore a depriva-
tion of a constitutionally-protected liberty interest. 96 The Court held
that the hair-length regulation was a rational way to make police
officers readily recognizable to the public and to foster an "esprit
de corps" among officers. 97
The Grusendorf court noted that Kelley was "similar" to the case
at hand, even though the plaintiff in Kelley was a police officer
rather than a firefighter and claimed a Fourteenth Amendment
right to grow a beard rather than a right to smoke a cigarette."
Consequently, the court of appeals gave the off-duty smoking reg-
ulation the same presumption of validity that was given to the hair-
length regulation in Kelley. 99 The Grusendorf court then applied the
same minimum rationality test that the Supreme Court applied in
Kelley.'" The Grusendorf court held that the nonsmoking regulation
was a rational way to promote the health and safety of firefighter
trainees.'°' In support of this conclusion, the court stated, "We need
look no further for a legitimate purpose and rational connection
than the Surgeon General's warning on the side of every box of
cigarettes sold in this country . . .',IO2
The Grusendorf court did state that one aspect of the regulation,
its application only to first-year firefighter trainees, did not seem
entirely rational.'" The court noted that other firefighters, whose
health and conditioning were also important, could smoke as many
93 Id. (citing Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 (1975)).
'm Kelley, 425 U.S. 238, at 249.
85 Id. at 247.
Id.
97
 Id. at 248.
98 Grusendorf v. City of Oklahoma City, 816 F.2d 539, 542 (10th Cir. 1987).
99 Id. at 543.
"}" Id.
'°' Id.
1 °' Id.
1 °3 Id. at 543.
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cigarettes as they liked.'" The court declined to resolve this issue
by noting that Grusendorf did not raise an equal protection chal-
lenge to the regulation.'° 5
B. Private Employees
To date, there have been no successful legal challenges to pri-
vate employer restrictions on off-duty smoking." Commentators
have suggested several possible arguments, however, that an em-
ployee might raise against these restrictions. 107 A smoking employee
might claim that his or her addiction to cigarettes is a protected
handicap under the new Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"),
which prohibits discrimination against individuals who are mentally
or physically disabled." One commentator argues that the struc-
ture of the ADA indicates congressional intent to include smoking
as a protected handicap under the Act." The ADA lists several
disorders and conditions that are specifically excluded from the
definition of disability, but does not include tobacco addiction
among these exclusions."° Smoking, however, is mentioned specif-
ically elsewhere in the Act, and the commentator infers from this
statutory scheme that Congress tacitly recognized tobacco addiction
as a defined disability."'
A private employee might also argue that an off-duty smoking
ban violates title VII of the Civil Rights Act of I964. 12 An employ-
er's refusal to hire smokers could lead to a disparate impact on
African Americans and Hispanics, since statistical studies show that
these groups smoke more than whites." 3 This disparate impact
could constitute illegal employment discrimination under title
VII."4
104
1 Id.
' 06 See Rothstein, supra note 8, at 956.
102 See, e.g., Rothstein, supra note 8, at 956; Thompson, supra note 3, at 522-23.
mo See 42 U.S.C.A. §$ 12101— 12213 (West 1991).
'°9 Jimmy Goh, Note, "Smokers Need Not Apply": Challenging Employment Discrimination
Against Smokers Under The Americans With Disabilities Act, 39 RAN. L. REV. 817, 820 (1991).
tio Id. at 832-33.
Id. at 833.
112 Thompson, supra note 3, at 523.
"3 id.
114 Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. * 2000e (1988). It should be noted, however, that the Supreme
Court rejected the use of statistical evidence to prove the disparate impact of an employer's
policy of refusing to hire methadone users. See New York Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S.
568, 594 (1979); Thompson, supra note 3, at 523.
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III. LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES TO OFF-DUTY SMOKING RESTRICTIONS:
SMOKERS' RIGHTS LAWS
The lack of success of public employees' constitutional chal-
lenges to off-duty smoking bans and the uncertainty of possible
remedies for private employees have led opponents of these restric-
tions to wage their battle in another arena—state legislatures." 5 To
date, twenty-one states have enacted legislation that prohibits em-
ployers from discriminating against employees who smoke off the
job."8 Of these twenty-one states, seventeen expressly prohibit dis-
crimination against employees who smoke while off-duty." 7 For
example, Indiana's smokers' rights statute provides, "An employer
may not . . . require, as a condition of employment, an employee
or prospective employee to refrain from using . . . or discriminate
against an employee . . . based on the employee's use of tobacco
products outside the course of the employee's or prospective em-
ployee's employment."" 8 Four states—Colorado, North Dakota, Ne-
vada and Illinois—have a more general prohibition against discrim-
ination based on an employee's off-duty participation in legal
activities or use of lawful products." 9
A. Tobacco-Specific Legislation
Presently, seventeen states have enacted legislation that specif-
ically prohibits employers from discriminating against employees
who smoke off the job.' 2° Although there are many similarities
among these laws, there are also important differences among them.
A comparison of the provisions of various tobacco-specific smokers'
rights laws demonstrates these similarities and differences in terms
of the employer practices they prohibit, the exceptions they make,
and the remedies they make available to employees.
1. Prohibited Employer Practices
Tobacco-specific laws prohibit employer discrimination against
off-duty smokers primarily in two ways. First, all of the statutes
prohibit employers from requiring, as a condition of employment,
See ACLU, supra note 26, at 5.
116 Sec supra note 11 for the list of states that have passed smokers' rights laws.
117 See supra note 12 for the list of tobacco-specific smokers' rights laws.
118 IND. CODE § 22-5-4--1 (1991).
119 See supra note 13.
1" See statutes cited supra note 12.
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that any employee or prospective employee refrain from smoking
outside work. 121 Second, many of the statutes also prohibit employ-
ers from discriminating against off-duty smokers with respect to
compensation and other terms of employment. 122 For example,
Connecticut's smokers' rights law prohibits employer discrimination
against smokers with respect to "compensation, terms, conditions
or privileges of employment." 123
An important difference between these statutes is that while
some states issue a blanket prohibition against discrimination based
on the off-duty use of tobacco,' 24 others, such as Oregon and New
Jersey, allow restrictions on off-duty smoking if those restrictions
are rationally related to the employee's job. 125 The Oregon statute,
for example, prohibits employer discrimination against smokers
"except when the restriction relates to a bona-fide occupational
requirement." 126 To date, there is virtually no case law on what jobs
qualify as being rationally related to smoking restrictions."'
2. Exceptions To Smokers' Rights Laws
Some smokers' rights statutes exempt certain organizations and
make other exceptions to the prohibition of employer discrimina-
tion against off-duty smokers. 128 Rhode Island's smokers' rights law
exempts nonprofit organizations, such as the American Cancer So-
ciety, which have a primary purpose to discourage smoking by the
general public. 12" Other states, such as Indiana, exempt religious
organizations and churches."°
12 ' See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, 597 (West 1991); 1991 N.H. Laws 275:37-a;
1991 Conn. Legis. Serv. 271(3) (West).
'" See, e.g., 1991 N.H. Laws 275:37-a.
' 23 1991 Conn. Legis. Serv. 271(3) (West); see also 1991 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 207 § 34:6B1
(West) (prohibiting an employer from taking "any adverse action against any employee with
respect to compensation, terms, conditions or other privileges of employment"); 1991 La.
Sess. Law Serv. 762(966) (West) (making it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against
an employee "with respect to discharge, compensation, promotion, any personnel action or
other condition, or privilege of employment because the individual is a smoker").
124 See IND. CODE 22-5-4-1 (1991); 1991 N.H. Laws 275:37-a.
"2 See Oa. Ray. STAT. § 659.380 (1989) (prohibiting restrictions on off-duty smoking
"except when the restriction relates to a bona fide occupational requirement").
] 26
127 As noted in section II, Grusendorf v. City of Oklahoma City is the only case to date
involving a constitutional challenge to an off-duty smoking ban for public employees. See
816 F.2d 539, 541 (10th Cir. 1987).
123 See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAws § 23-20.7.1-1 (1989).
122 Id.; see also 1991 Conn. Legis. Serv. 271(3) (West).
"0 IND. CODE § 22-5-4-4 (1991).
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An important exception made by some states relates to the
provisions of collective bargaining agreements in those states."'
Connecticut's smokers' rights law provides, "Nothing contained in
this section shall be construed to affect ... any collective bargaining
agreement between a municipality and paid firefighters or paid
police officers."'" Oregon's statute does not apply if a collective
bargaining agreement prohibits the off-duty use of tobacco prod-
ucts.'"
3. Remedies Available to Employees
Almost all states provide aggrieved employees only civil reme-
dies under smokers' rights statutes.' 34 Oregon's smokers' rights stat-
ute, however, provides for criminal as well as civil penalties.' 35 States
generally allow employees to sue for damages, injunctive relief or
both.'"
Under South Dakota's smokers' rights law, an aggrieved em-
ployee may only sue for lost wages and benefits up to the date of
the judgment.'" Other states provide employees with more exten-
sive remedies.'" Rhode Island's statute provides that a court may
"[a]ward up to three times the actual damages to a prevailing em-
ployee or prospective employee [and] . . . [a]ward court costs to a
prevailing employee or prospective employee . . ."'" Under In-
diana's and New Jersey's smokers' rights laws, a court can award a
prevailing employee reasonable attorney's fees in addition to dam-
ages and court costs.' 4°
In addition to damages, court costs and attorney's fees, smok-
ers' rights statutes often authorize courts to grant aggrieved em-
ployees injunctive relief."' The New Jersey statute specifically au-
thorizes a court to reinstate an employee to the same position he or
she held before the violation, or the position the employee would
have held but for the violation, including full fringe benefits and
"I See, e.g., 1991 Conn. Legis. Serv. 271(3) (West).
132 Id.
I" OR, REV. STAT. § 659.380 (1989).
"4 See, e.g., 1991 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 60-4-14 (1991).
I " OR. REV. STAT. 659.380 (1989).
'" See, e.g., 1991 N.J. Sess, Law Serv. 207(34:6B3) (West).
"7
 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 60-4-14 (1991).
138 See, e.g., R.I. GEN, LAWS 23-20.7.1-1 (1989).
"9 Id.
140
 END. CODE § 22-5-4-2 (1991); 1991 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 207(34:6133) (West),
141 See, e.g., IND. CODE 22-5-4-2 (1991); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-20,7.1-1 (1989).
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seniority rights. 142 Indiana's smokers' rights law provides simply that
a court may "[e]njoin further violation of this chapter." 143 One state,
Louisiana, does not offer employees any civil remedy whatsoever
for employer violations of its smokers' rights law.'" Instead, the
statute provides for employer fines of up to five hundred dollars
per violation. 145
B. General Privacy Legislation
To date, four states have enacted legislation that would prevent
employers from discriminating against employees because they
smoke off-duty, but that does not specifically mention smoking or
tobacco. 146 Illinois, for example, prohibits employer discrimination
against employees or applicants who use "lawful products off the
premises of the employer during nonworking hours." 147 Other
states, like North Dakota, prohibit discrimination against employees
or applicants who engage in legal activities while off-duty." 8 While
these laws cover a broader range of discriminatory practices, they
are similar to tobacco-specific statutes in terms of the employer
policies they prohibit, the exceptions they make and the remedies
they make available to aggrieved employees. 149 The Illinois work-
place privacy law prohibits employer discrimination with respect to
compensation or other conditions of employment.m The Illinois
law also exempts nonprofit organizations that have a primary pur-
pose to discourage the use of certain lawful products. 181 With re-
spect to remedies, the Illinois law allows a court to award a pre-
vailing employee damages, costs and reasonable attorney's fees.'"
C. Policy Rationales for Smokers' Rights Laws
1. Employees Right to Privacy
The primary justification for smokers' rights legislation is the
protection of employees' rights to privacy and autonomy.'" The
142
 1991 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 207(34:6B3) (West).
"3 IND. CODE § 22-5-4-2 (1991).
144 1991 La. Sess. Law Serv. 762(966) (West).
"3 Id.
148 See supra note 11.
197 1991 III. Legis. Serv. 87-807 (West).
118 1991 N.D. Laws 142(14-02.4-01).
"9 See supra notes 118-45 and accompanying text.
139 1991 III. Legis. Serv. 87-807 (West).
131 Id.
152 ,rd.
133 ACLU, supra note 26, at 3.
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American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU") takes the position that
sacrificing the privacy of working Americans is not justified by any
possible economic savings to employers from off-duty smoking
bans.'" The ACLU points out that risks are associated with almost
all personal lifestyle choices that individuals make. 155 They claim
that if employers are permitted to ban off-duty smoking, there will
be no way to draw a line as to what behaviors they can or cannot
regulate.' 56 The real issue involved in smokers' rights legislation,
according to the ACLU, is the right of individuals to lead their lives
as they choose. 157
2. Problems with Enforcing Off-Duty Smoking Restrictions
Some commentators have argued that enforcing off-duty smok-
ing bans would require intrusive verification techniques, which
could create significant legal and moral problems.' 58 Mark A. Roth-
stein, Professor of Law and Director of the Health Law Institute at
the University of Houston, has noted such problems with several
possible methods, including employer monitoring of employee
health insurance claims and medical records.'" Rothstein claims
that because access to medical records is already too widespread,
this method of verification by employers should be avoided.'"
Employers could also rely on reports of observations of em-
ployees smoking as a means of verification.' In order to facilitate
reporting of these observations, employers could establish "hotlines"
where observations could be reported anonymously.' 62 Rothstein
claims that even if this method were effective in reducing cigarette
smoking, it would be an untenable method of verification because
it would create disruptions in employee relations and other prob-
lems.' 63
Rothstein also rejects the use of polygraphs to verify employee
statements that they did not smoke, pointing to polygraphs' intru-
siveness and inaccuracy.'" Finally, he rejects the use of urine or
I" Id.
' 55 Id.
' 56 Id.
"7 Id.
' 55 Rothstein, supra note 8, at 961; see also Thompson, supra note 3, at 524-27.
154 Rothstein, supra note 8, at 961.
' 60 Id. at 961-62.
151
 Id. at 962.
I Ii2
103
'64
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blood tests to detect the biochemical changes caused by smoking.' 65
According to Rothstein, these tests are controversial even for public
safety positions.' 66 He argues that because off-duty smokers do not
pose significant health or safety risks to others, it is unlikely that
the public would accept the use of these tests to verify employee
compliance with off-duty smoking bans.' 67
3. The Involuntary Nature of Smoking Due to the Addictiveness
of Cigarettes
Another policy justification for smokers' rights laws is based on
the addictive nature of cigarette smoking.'" According to a 1988
Surgeon General's report, cigarettes and other forms of tobacco are
addictive, and not merely habit-forming.'" The report also found
that the pharmacologic and behavioral processes that determine
tobacco addiction are similar to those that determine addiction to
drugs such as heroin and cocaine.'" Employer policies that discrim-
inate against off-duty smokers thus may be unfair in that they
punish employees for behavior that they are arguably unable to
control.' 71
IV. PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF SMOKERS' RIGHTS LAWS
A. Smokers' Rights Laws as a Means to Protect Employees' Right to
Privacy and Autonomy
While smokers' rights laws purport to protect the right to pri-
vacy and autonomy of smoking employees, 172 their actual effect is
to interfere with the right of employers to make rational business
judgments about employment decisions. Given the evidence of
higher costs, increased absenteeism and lower productivity associ-
ated with employees who smoke,'" employer policies favoring nons-
mokers over smokers are clearly reasonable. Thus, the ACLU's
claim that off-duty smoking bans violate employees' right to
"36 Id.
1137 1d.
1' C. EVERETT KOOP, THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING: NICOTINE ADDICTION 9
(1988) [hereinafter NICOTINE ADDICTION].
1" a
170 id.
171 See Rothstein, supra note 8, at 963.
172 ACLU, supra note 26, at 3.
175 See supra notes 47-76 and accompanying text.
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privacy' 74 mischaracterizes the issue as it relates to smokers' rights
laws. Employer bans of off-duty smoking do not prevent any indi-
vidual from smoking in the privacy of his or her home. On the
other hand, smokers' rights laws, backed by the coercive power of
the state, prevent employers from drawing their own conclusions
about the importance of smoking as a criterion in employment
decisions.
That several smokers' rights statutes contain certain exceptions
also undermines the ACLU's privacy rationale.'" For example,
Rhode Island's smokers' rights law exempts nonprofit organizations
that have a primary purpose to discourage the use of tobacco prod-
ucts by the general public.'" Nevertheless, employees of such or-
ganizations have the same right to privacy as do other employees
protected by the statute. By exempting such organizations, the
Rhode Island statute is, in effect, admitting that smoking is an
appropriate criterion for employment decisions under some circum-
stances. Yet instead of allowing employers to decide for themselves
when smoking is relevant to employment, state legislatures have
taken it upon themselves to decide the issue. Given the evidence
linking employees who smoke with higher costs and lower produc-
tivity, employers should be permitted to make such a determination
for themselves.
Another justification offered for smokers' rights laws is that if
employers are allowed to ban off-duty smoking, there will be no
way to prevent them from requiring employees to refrain from
other "risky," but legal activities, such as eating high-fat foods, or
drinking alcohol.'" This argument, however, assumes that there is
no meaningful difference between smoking and these other activi-
ties. The magnitude of the health and economic costs of smoking,'"
and the highly addictive nature of tobacco,'" make employees who
smoke a significantly greater problem for employers than employees
who engage in other supposedly risky behaviors. Smoking, unlike
other behaviors, causes several hundred thousand premature
deaths each year,'" is a major cause of heart disease, and is the
major cause of chronic obstructive lung disease and certain cancers
171
 ACLU, supra note 26, at 3.
"5 See id.
' 7° R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-20.7.1-1 (1989).
177
 ACLU, supra note 26, at 3.
178 See supra notes 26-76 and accompanying text.
t" See supra notes 168-71 and accompanying text.
1" Warner, supra note 1, at 2081.
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in the United States today.' 8 ' Each employee who smokes has been
estimated to cost employers approximately $4,600 per year due to
increased absenteeism, extra insurance costs and lower productiv-
ity. 182
 Indeed, the evidence of smoking's enormous health and eco-
nomic costs is precisely what has led many employers to ban smok-
ing, and not other supposedly risky activities.'"
The highly addictive nature of cigarette smoking also creates
special problems for employers in dealing with employees who
smoke off the job.'84 Many companies, either by law or by choice,
impose significant restrictions on workplace smoking. 185 Employees
who smoke off the job, because of their addiction, are more likely
than nonsmokers to create problems with enforcing workplace re-
strictions.'" The compulsive behavior of smokers, like the compul-
sive behavior of heroin or cocaine addicts, creates problems for
employers that are not created by other risky, but non-addictive
activities. 187
Even if off-work smoking bans implicate some privacy interests
of employees,' 88 these statutes do not provide employees who smoke
any meaningful protection against discrimination. Many employers,
because of the costs associated with employees who smoke,' 89 will
still want to hire only nonsmokers. Consequently, instead of pro-
tecting applicants or employees who smoke, smokers' rights laws
will merely lead employers to give other explanations for not hiring,
or firing smokers. Thus, according to Professor William Weiss of
Seattle University, smokers will be penalized doubly by employers
who refuse to disclose that it is smoking, and not other factors,
costing them a job.' 9°
B. Vagueness of Smokers' Rights Laws
Another problem with smokers' rights statutes is that they do
not state precisely what employer practices they prohibit. For ex-
" 1 See supra notes 32-46 and accompanying text.
'" Garfinkel, supra note 6, at 5; see also Thompson, supra note 3, at 496-97.
183 See supra notes 47-76 and accompanying text.
1 " See KOOP, NICOTINE ADDICTION, supra note 168, at 9.
188 Rothstein, supra note 8, at 946.
'" See id. at 953.
187 See KOOP, NICOTINE ADDICTION, supra note 168, at 9.
188
 In Grusendorf v. City of Oklahoma City, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit stated that off-duty smoking bans did implicate some liberty and privacy
interests of employees, but that these interests did not rise to the level of fundamental rights.
816 F.2d 539,541 (10th Cir. 1987).
'" See supra notes 47-76 and accompanying text.
190
 Advice to Applicants—Looking for a Job' Don't Smoke, supra note 75, at 340.
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ample, the New Jersey statute provides that "[n]t) employer shall
refuse to hire or employ any person . . . because that person does
or does not smoke ...." 191 It is not clear from this language whether
employers are prohibited from giving any consideration to whether
an applicant smokes, or if employers are only prohibited from
basing an employment decision solely on whether an applicant
smokes. If the statute is interpreted as prohibiting employers from
giving any consideration to whether an applicant smokes, it will also
be necessary to prevent employers from finding out if an applicant
smokes. Without this restriction, it will be impossible to ensure that
employers do not consider the information in hiring decisions. If
on the other hand the statute is construed as permitting some
consideration of whether an applicant smokes, it may be difficult
for a court to sift through an employer's motives in refusing to hire
an applicant and decide when smoking played too great a role in
the employment decision.
The New Jersey statute also permits an employer to discrimi-
nate against smokers if the employer "has a rational basis for doing
so which is reasonably related to the employment, including the
responsibilities of the employee or prospective employee." 92 The
issue of under what circumstances a smoking ban would be ration-
ally related to public employment was discussed by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Grusendorf v. City of
Oklahoma City.'" Although Grusendorf itself dealt with a public em-
ployment situation, the court's approach may be helpful in predict-
ing how a state court, interpreting a smokers' rights statute, might
resolve the issue of whether a smoking ban by a private employer
is rationally related to employment.
Grusendorf held that an off-duty smoking ban for trainee fire-
fighters was constitutional because it was rationally related to the
health and safety of those firefighters. 194 It is not clear, however,
how far that holding should be extended in the context of smoking
bans for other employees. Both Grusendorf and Kelley v. Johnson
involved regulation of the off-duty conduct of public safety em-
ployees, whose health and fitness are clearly important to their
ability to carry out their duties.' 95 It is not certain that the health
' 9 ' 1991 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 207(34:6B1) (West).
152 Id.; see also OR. REV. STAT. § 659.380 (1989) (permitting restrictions on off-duty
smoking where the restriction "relates to a bona fide occupational requirement").
393 816 F.2d 539, 543 (10th Cir. 1987).
1°4 Id.
' 95 As noted in section II, Grusendorf involved the off-duty conduct of firefighters, and
Kelley involved the hair-length regulations for police officers. See Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S.
238, 240 (1975); Grusendorf, 816 F.2d at 540.
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and safety rationale used by the Grusendorf court would be as ap-
plicable to employees with, for example, desk jobs, whose fitness is
not as critical to their performance. On the other hand, because of
the overwhelming evidence of smoking's adverse health effects, 196
a court could find a rational relationship between a smoking ban
and the health and safety of any employee, irrespective of that
employee's job.' 97 While there have not yet been any cases inter-
preting smokers' rights statutes, the "rational relation" exception
contained in the New Jersey' 98 and Oregon 199 laws is likely to be
the subject of considerable litigation in the future, given the ambi-
guity of the statutory language and the uncertainty under current
law as to when smoking is rationally related to employment. 200
C. The Failure of Smokers' Rights Laws to Distinguish Between
Applicants and Employees
The biggest problem with smokers' rights laws is that they
generally fail to make any meaningful distinction between appli-
cants and employees. 20 ' The two groups, however, are in very dif-
ferent situations with respect to off-duty smoking bans. A smoker
employed at a company that now wants to implement an off-duty
ban probably took his or her job with the expectation that he or
she would be permitted to smoke off-duty. The employee may well
have taken steps, such as moving or selling a home, in reliance on
that expectation. It would be unfair for an employer to upset that
employee's expectation and suddenly make not smoking a continu-
ing condition of employment.
Furthermore, the unfairness of imposing an off-duty ban on
an employee who smokes is magnified by the highly addictive nature
of tobacco. 202 Even an employee who in good faith tries to quit
smoking to comply with a smoking ban will probably find quitting
extremely difficult because of his or her addiction. 203 Thus, impos-
ing off-duty bans on employees who smoke is unfair not only be-
cause those employees may have relied on being able to smoke
196 See supra notes 32-46 and accompanying text.
197 See Grusendolf, 816 F,2d at 543.
' 98 1991 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 207(34:6B1) (West).
' 99 OR. REV. STAT. § 659.380 (1989).
2°2 See OR. REV. STAT. § 659.380 (1989); 1991 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 207(34:6B1) (West).
2°1 See, e.g., 1991 Conn. Legis. Serv. 271(3) (West).
202 See supra notes 168-71 and accompanying text.
2°' Id,
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when they were hired, but also because it punishes them for behav-
ior that they may not be able to control.
The equitable considerations in favor of job applicants, how-
ever, are not nearly as compelling as those for employees. Unlike
an employee, an applicant who smokes has not taken any steps in
reliance on his or her ability to smoke. While it may be unfair to
punish applicants for behavior that is arguably beyond their control,
such considerations must be weighed against an employer's right to
make rational employment decisions. While the equities in favor of
an employee who smokes may outweigh the right of an employer
to implement an off-duty smoking ban for all employees, no such
balance of equities favors job applicants over employers who wish
to hire only nonsmokers.
Thus, the distinction in the Oklahoma City ordinance between
new and old firefighters that the Grusendorf court implied was ir-
rational was, in fact, a reasonable balancing of equities. 2°4 Oklahoma
City's interest in having healthy firefighters may well be outweighed
by current firefighters' reliance on being able to smoke when they
were hired. Firefighter trainees, however, who took their positions
on the condition that they not smoke, have no such equitable inter-
ests to balance against the city's interest in having a healthy fire
department.
D. A Proposal for Legislation: A Model Smokers' Rights Statute
Current smokers' rights laws stiffer from several serious prob-
lems. They are unfair to employers because they prevent them from
weighing in hiring decisions the enormous health and economic
costs of smoking. Current laws purport to protect employees' rights
to privacy and autonomy, but exceptions contained in several of the
statutes leave many employees vulnerable to unfair employer dis-
crimination. Finally, current smokers' rights laws fail to distinguish
between applicants and employees, who are in very different posi-
tions with respect to the fairness of off-duty smoking bans. As a
way to resolve these difficulties, this note proposes the following
model smokers' rights statute:
1. Discrimination Against Employees Who Smoke Is
Illegal
a. It shall be illegal for an employer to discrimi-
nate against any employee who was permitted by the
404 See Grusendorl v. City of Oklahoma City, 816 F.2d 539, 543 (10th Cir. 1987).
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employer to smoke when hired, with respect to that
employee's compensation, terms, conditions or other
privileges of employment, because that employee
smokes outside the scope of his or her employment.
An employer may require that an employee partici-
pate in a wellness or smoking cessation program,
provided that such program is provided free of
charge to the employee.
b. Nothing in section (a) shall be construed as
prohibiting an employer from requiring, as a condi-
tion of employment, that a prospective employee re-
frain from smoking outside the scope of his or her
employment.
2. Enforcement
a. An employee may bring a civil action against
an employer to enforce section (1)(a) of this chapter.
b. If an employer violates section (1)(a) of this
chapter, a court may:
I. Award actual damages, court costs, and rea-
sonable attorney's fees to a prevailing em-
ployee, and/or:
2. Enjoin further violation of this chapter. .
E. Issues Raised by the Model Statute
By viewing employer off-duty smoking bans in the context of
a balancing of equities rather than as a right to privacy issue, and
by distinguishing between applicants and employees, states can draft
smokers' rights statutes that avoid many of the problems involved
with current laws. Under this approach, there is no need to make
exceptions for organizations like the American Cancer Society,
which have a primary purpose to discourage smoking by the general
public. Employees of such organizations who had accepted their
jobs in reliance on their being able to smoke would suffer the same
hardships if they were fired as would other employees and thus
deserve the same protections. Current statutes, by treating employ-
ees the same as applicants and by exempting such organizations,
thus both go too far, and not far enough, in protecting the rights
of smokers. They go too far in that they prohibit employers from
using a relevant and reasonable criterion in their hiring decisions.
They don't go far enough in that they allow certain employers to
decide one day that smoking employees, who were previously per-
mitted to smoke while off-duty, suddenly must quit or lose their
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job. The model statute, by distinguishing between employees and
applicants, and by eliminating the exceptions, more fairly balances
the rights of employees who smoke with the right of employers to
shape the structure of their workforce in accordance with their own
business judgment.
By protecting employees, but not applicants, the model statute
also reduces the problems associated with enforcing off-duty smok-
ing bans. Once an individual has been "screened" for smoking
before he or she is hired, employers no longer need to use intrusive
verification techniques to determine whether an employee is con-
tinuing not to smoke. The number of applicants who manage to
conceal their smoking when they are hired, or who take up smoking
afterwards, will probably be small enough so that employers could
rely on informal verification methods, such as third-party observa-
tions, to enforce an off-duty ban.
The model statute also solve's some of the practical problems
involved in enforcing smokers' rights laws. Current statutes do not
provide much real protection to applicants because employers can
easily fabricate generic, hard-to-challenge reasons for refusing to
hire a smoker. In not extending protection to applicants, the model
statute eliminates the need for employers to invent reasons for
employment decisions, and at least allows the smoking applicant to
learn the real reason he or she was not hired.
In addition, the model statute does not incorporate vague,
litigation-provoking provisions permitting discrimination against
smokers that is rationally related to an employer's business. Instead,
it permits employers, not the courts, to decide when smoking is
rationally related to their businesses, but prohibits discrimination
against smoking employees who were permitted to smoke when
hired. The model statute also removes any doubt as to whether
employers may give any consideration at all to whether an applicant
smokes. Under the statute, employers may give the matter whatever
consideration they deem appropriate.
The remedies available to an aggrieved employee under the
model statute—injunctive relief, damages, costs and reasonable at-
torney's fees—are similar to the remedies available under several
current smokers' rights laws. 205 If a prevailing employee could not
recover his or her costs and reasonable attorney's fees, it is likely
that a significant number of aggrieved employees would as a prac-
205 See, e.g., IND. CODE § 22-5-4-2 (1991); 1991 III. Legis. Serv. 87-807(d) (West).
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tical matter have no legal recourse, because they might not be able
to afford an attorney. Thus, the availability of costs and attorney's
fees to prevailing employees is necessary to afford employees mean-
ingful protection under smokers' rights statutes against discrimi-
nation.
V. CONCLUSION
Current smokers' rights laws suffer from several serious short-
comings. While they purport to protect smoking employees' right
to privacy, their actual effect is to infringe on the right of employers
to make rational employment decisions. Current statutes often ex-
empt certain organizations, leaving employees of these organiza-
tions vulnerable to discrimination that could cause significant hard-
ships. Current smokers' rights laws also often contain vague
provisions permitting employer discrimination against smokers
where there is a rational relation between smoking and the job at
issue. Given the current uncertainty in the law regarding under
what circumstances smoking is rationally related to employment,
these provisions are a likely source of future litigation. Most signif-
icantly, current smokers' rights laws fail to distinguish between em-
ployees and applicants, who are in very different situations with
respect to the fairness of off-bans by employers.
By protecting employees but not applicants, and by eliminating
certain exceptions, the model statute eliminates or reduces many of
the . problems involved with current smokers' rights laws and more
fairly balances the rights of employers and employees. Employers
would be able to take into account the health and economic costs
of smoking in their hiring decisions, and employees who were per-
mitted to smoke when hired would be protected against unfair
employer discrimination.
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